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Patent Rights in the
Human Genome Project
Rebecca S. Eisenberg

The various research efforts that comprise the Human Genome Project will
inevitably both draw on and yield a multitude of patentable inventions. The
broad subject matter of the patent laws potentially reaches every phase of the
Genome Project, from the discovery of new research technologies, such as
techniques and equipment for DNA sequencing, through the ultimate development of new products, such as screening tests for genetically transmitted
diseases. Even bits and pieces of the human genome itself may be, and sometimes have been, patented.' Nor does the fact that the public is paying for the
Genome Project through federal funding mean that the public may freely
enjoy the fruits of that research. Quite the contrary, existing law not only permits, but affirmatively encourages, patenting and private commercial exploitation of inventions made in the course of the Genome Project.
Nonetheless, the prospect of private ownership of knowledge emanating
from the Genome Project has provoked controversy. The National Research
Council Committee on Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome concluded in its 1988 study that "human genome sequences should be a public
trust" not subject to the intellectual property laws,2 while the Office of Technology Assessment's 1988 report on the Genome Project suggested that federal agencies and Congress should instead promote early filing of patent applications followed by prompt release of data. 3 By early 1992, the controversy
had focused on the filing by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) of patent
226
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applications on some 2,375 partial cDNA sequences identified in its laboratories, along with the as-yet unidentified full genes and gene products to which
they correspond.
Given the magnitude of resources invested in the Human Genome Project
in both the public and private sectors and the tremendous potential benefits
to be reaped from this research, the role of the patent laws in this area deserves
careful thought. Ideally, patent law should promote the progress of research
and product development and the dissemination of research results. This
chapter clarifies some of the implications of patent law for the Genome
Project, with a view to identifying problems that might interfere with the
smooth operation of the patent system in this context.

Summary of Existing Law and Policy
A U.S. patent confers the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the patented
invention in the United States for seventeen years from the date the patent
issues. 4 During this term, the patent holder has the right to prevent anyone
from using the invention-even an innocent infringer who develops the same
invention independently,5 and even a subsequent inventor who improves on
the basic invention to such a degree that the improvement itself earns a patent.6 In exchange for these broad exclusive rights, the inventor must disclose
the invention to the public in terms that enable others who are "skilled in the
art" to make and use it. 7 So long as the disclosure requirement is satisfied, it
is not necessary for the patent applicant to have actually made a tangible
embodiment of the invention in the laboratory. Judicial decisions characterize the disclosure as the "quid pro quo" of the patent monopoly. 8 In order to
obtain a patent, the applicant must first contribute "a measure of worthwhile
knowledge to the public storehouse. " 9 A patent consists of a written description of the invention and of how to make and use it, often accompanied by
figures or drawings, and one or more "claims" specifying exactly what it is
that others may not make, use, or sell. 10
It is a fundamental axiom of patent law that one may patent only that
which is new. Section 101 of the Patent Act defines as patentable subject matter "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 11 The Supreme Court
has construed this language broadly to include "anything under the sun that
is made by man," including genetically engineered living organisms. 12
Although products of nature may not be patented as such, patents have been
issued on such products in human-altered form. For example, bacteria or
chemicals that are newly isolated and purified may be patented in an isolated
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and purified state if they exist in nature only in an impure state. 13 Consistent
with these principles, patents have been issued on proteins and DNA
sequences from the human genome that have been purified and isolated
through human intervention. 14 The requirement that a patentable invention
be "useful" excludes from protection certain scientific discoveries that,
although interesting as a subject of further research, cannot yet be used for
any practical human purpose. 15 Some critics of the NIH patent applications
on partial cDNA sequences have argued that these inventions fail to satisfy
this utility requirement, but few patents are rejected on this basis. Patents
have been issued for DNA sequences that code for useful proteins 16 or that
serve as probes to detect genetic susceptibility to disease. 17
In addition to being new and useful, an invention must satisfy the further
statutory requirement of nonobviousness 18 to be patentable. One may not
obtain a patent by disclosing an "invention" that is already available to the
public, whether because it was previously known or because it is readily discoverable through obvious advances over the prior art. As the prior art in a
field grows, the nonobviousness requirement makes more and more subsequent discoveries unpatentable.
For the past decade federal patent policy has actively encouraged the patenting and commercialization of inventions made in the course of federally
sponsored research. 19 Legislation enacted in 1980 requires small businesses
and nonprofit organizations, including universities, 20 to report promptly to
the funding agency any potentially patentable inventions made in the course
of sponsored research. 21 The statute permits recipient institutions to retain
title to their inventions if they agree to file patent applications in a timely
manner and to ensure that the inventions are utilized. 22 Patent holders may
either exploit their patents themselves or license someone else to exploit
them, but if they do neither, the government reserves "march-in" rights to
grant licenses in order to ensure practical application of the inventions. 23
The underlying premise of this statutory scheme is that the public benefits
more from inventions made in the course of federally sponsored research
when those inventions are patented and exploited commercially in the private sector. 24 Inventions left in the public domain are presumed to languish
in government and university archives rather than to be freely and widely
exploited. Note that this vision of the role of patents is different from the timehonored justification for the patent system as a means of promoting investment in research to make new inventions. The traditional conception of the
role of patents concedes that patents actually restrict dissemination of the
inventions they cover, but nonetheless justifies the creation of patent monopolies as a means of inducing firms to undertake the necessary research to
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make such inventions in the first place. In the context offederally sponsored
inventions, the government is not offering patent rights as an ex ante incentive to stimulate future inventions, but rather is insisting on patent protection
ex post for inventions that have already been made. The justification is that
existing patent rights facilitate the commercial dissemination of products
embodying the results of prior research, not that the prospect of future patent
rights will stimulate future research. While this philosophy may seem counterintuitive to scientists whose norms enjoin them to make their research
results freely available to the public, 25 for the time being it seems to be firmly
entrenched in federal law and policy.

Impact on the Genome Project
What is the likely impact on the Genome Project of a policy that encourages
patenting of federally funded inventions? Will such a policy ultimately promote or impede full utilization of knowledge gained through this research? A
thorough response to this question would require a broad reexamination of
the effectiveness of the patent system as a whole. Rather than taking on such
a daunting task in these brief remarks, I will instead assume, along with federal policy makers, that in many contexts the patent system is an effective
means of promoting widespread dissemination of new discoveries through
commercial channels. The question I will pose is whether there are particular
reasons to question its effectiveness in this specific context. I shall first analyze
the likely impact of patent incentives on the conduct of the research itselfand
then consider the effectiveness of patent law in promoting full commercial
utilization of knowledge generated in the Genome Project.

Impact on the Conduct ofResearch
One reason for concern that a broad federal policy in favor of patenting
research results might be unsuitable for the Genome Project is that the Project
is a long-term, ongoing research project in which continued progress will
depend on prompt, unfettered access to prior discoveries. To the extent that
patent law creates barriers to such access, it may impede progress.
Perhaps the biggest danger that patenting presents to progress in the
Genome Project is that researchers seeking to preserve patent rights will defer
publication of their findings and thereby retard the dissemination of new
knowledge. While the patent system ultimately compels disclosure of whatever information is necessary in order to make and use a patented invention, 26
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disclosure through the U.S. patent system does not occur until a patent
issues,2 7 which is likely to be years after a discovery is made. Academic
researchers who want to earn recognition for their discoveries in the scientific
community may wish to publish their inventions in journals at an earlier
date, but early disclosure is risky for those who plan to seek patent protection.
A scientist who discloses an invention in a publication before applying for a
patent forfeits patent protection immediately in most of the world, although
U.S. patent law allows filing ofan application up to one year thereafter. 28
The solution to this dilemma might seem to be for scientists to file patent
applications promptly and then publish their research results, 29 but there are
problems with this strategy. For one thing, research may yield publishable
results before it yields a patentable invention. 30 In this situation publication
of early results could prevent patenting of later-developed inventions emanating from the same research if the publication makes the subsequent inventions "obvious. " 31 Another risk is that publication of a narrow form of an
invention may preclude patenting of a more broadly claimed invention at a
later date. 32 Thus a fully informed scientist who wants both patent protection
and scientific recognition may publish her discoveries later than she would if
she had no interest in patent protection. Delays in publication of research
results pertaining to patented inventions could be minimized by accelerating
the progress of patent applications through the Patent and Trademark Office,
but this problem is hardly unique to the Genome Project.
One might question how many scientists participating in the Genome
Project will actually delay publishing their work to any significant degree
because of patent considerations. For commercial scientists, the possibility of
obtaining patent rights might make publication more likely than it would be
if they had to rely on secrecy to preserve intellectual property rights in their
discoveries. 33 As for scientists in universitites, a recent empirical study found
that academic scientists receiving funds from biotechnology companies both
patented and published their research results at a higher rate than their colleagues who did not receive such funding, 34 suggesting that patent considerations need not interfere unduly with publication. But it stands to reason that,
faced with the risk of losing patent rights through premature publication,
some scientists will publish research results later than they would if they had
no concern about patents.
A potentially more harmful consequence of patenting discoveries made in
the course of the Genome Project is that patent holders could restrict access
to these discoveries in ways that impede subsequent research. A patent holder
normally has complete discretion whether to exploit the invention as a
monopolist, to license it on an exclusive or nonexclusive basis, or to suppress
the invention entirely. Such broad exclusive rights could potentially retard
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scientific progress, particularly in the case of patents on research technologies
developed early on for use in later stages of the Genome Project.
But present law does provide exceptions to the general rule of private control over access to publicly funded inventions. These exceptions might be
invoked to retain some measure of public control over the results of the
Genome Project. Specifically, the statute allows the funding agency to exercise "march-in" rights to grant or compel the granting oflicenses to federally
funded inventions if it determines that such action is necessary "to achieve
practical application of the subject invention. " 35 So far, the meaning of this
language has not been tested in litigation.
At the very least, this provision should permit mandatory licensing of
inventions that would otherwise go unused. It is less clear whether it permits
such licensing in the case of inventions that are being used exclusively by the
patent holder. For example, a grant recipient that discovered and patented a
group of partial cDNA sequences might want to keep the sequences to itself
in order to give its own researchers an advantage over competitors in finding
(and possibly patenting) the corresponding full genes and gene products. In
such a situation, the patent holder might try to avoid the exercise of marchin rights by arguing that it has achieved "practical application" of the inventions in its own laboratories, and thereby satisfied the statute, without having
to make the inventions available to others. On the other hand, if the practical
effect of such exclusivity is to restrict utilization of the invention to a significant degree, a compelling case could be made for the exercise of march-in
rights. As articulated in the patent statute, the purpose of allowing grant
recipients to retain patent rights is "to promote the utilization of [federally
funded] inventions," to be sure that such inventions "are used in a manner
to promote free competition and enterprise," "to promote the commercialization and public availability of[such] inventions," and to "protect the public against non use or unreasonable use ofinventions." 36 Hoarding of patented
research intermediaries for the exclusive use of patent holders, to the detriment of research in other laboratories, flies in the face of these policies.
Two additional exceptions in the statute appear potentially applicable in
this context, although so far funding agencies have construed both of them
narrowly. One provides that a funding agency retains a paid-up, nonexclusive
license "to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States [the
federally funded invention] throughout the world." 37 On its face, this language arguably permits agencies to authorize subsequent grant recipients to
use the inventions of prior grant recipients without payment of royalties on
the theory that they are practicing the inventions "on behalf of the United
States" when they use them in federally sponsored research. So far, however,
agencies have viewed this provision as limited to situations where the govern-
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ment wants to obtain a patented product for strictly governmental purposes
from someone other than the patent holder. 38
The other statutory exception allows an agency to prevent recipients of
research funds from retaining title to inventions "in exceptional circumstances when it is determined by the agency that restriction or elimination of
the right to retain title to any subject invention will better promote the policy
and objectives of this chapter." 39 The language of the statute and regulations
promulgated thereunder suggest that this exception should be used sparingly.40 The statute presupposes that its objectives are ordinarily best achieved
by allowing fund recipients to retain patent rights. In order to show "exceptional circumstances," it would seem necessary at the very least to distinguish
the research results at issue from other inventions made in the course offederally funded research, and to explain why the patent system is less likely to
promote utilization and dissemination of inventions in this context than in
other contexts.
Finally, apart from these statutory provisions, the courts have recognized
a limited, nonstatutory exception to a patent holder's exclusive rights for the
use of a patented invention in pure, noncommercial research. 41 It is difficult
to determine the scope of this exception with clarity because, although many
courts have acknowledged its existence in principle, almost none have actually applied it to the facts of the cases before them to excuse otherwise infringing activity. A recent judicial decision characterized the experimental use
defense as "truly narrow," 42 and it seems unlikely to provide significant protection for researchers until its terms are clarified through further caselaw or
legislation.
A statutory "experimental use" defense to permit the use of patented
inventions in the Genome Project would not be without precedent43 and has
much to recommend it as a matter of policy. 44 One difficulty with a royaltyfree experimental use exemption for subsequent researchers is that in the case
of a patent on research technology, researchers are the only consumers of the
invention. A rule that exempts these consumers from infringement liability
entirely would eliminate the patent holder's profits and effectively eviscerate
the incentive for commercialization offered by the patent. Nor would such an
exemption ordinarily be necessary in order to make patented research technology available to researchers: holders of patents on such technology will
generally view researchers as potential customers and will want to extend
licenses to them in order to collect royalties. But in some situations, particularly when the subsequent researcher is doing further research in competition with the patent holder, the patent holder might have more to lose by
allowing the use to proceed than it stands to gain by collecting royalties from
the researcher. In this context an experimental use defense may be necessary
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for the research to proceed, although it might be appropriate to compel the
subsequent to user to pay royalties to the patent holder. 45 In effect, this would
amount to a compulsory license in favor of subsequent researchers rather
than an exemption from infringement liability.
If the only purpose of an experimental use exemption is to compel the holders of patents on federally funded inventions to extend licenses to subsequent
researchers, this objective might possibly be achieved without any new legislation through the exercise of march-in rights by funding agencies. A statutory experimental use exemption might nonetheless be useful in that it could
clarify ambiguity as to the scope of the exemption under existing case law,
obviate the need for funding agencies to go through cumbersome procedures
to exercise march-in rights, 46 and ensure researchers access to inventions
whether or not they were made with federal funds.
The problem of patent seekers deferring disclosure of new findings may be
more intractable than the problem of patent holders restricting access to their
inventions.

Impact on Practical Utilization ofNew Knowledge
The argument for patent protection is less threatening to the research community when the invention at issue is a medical product or process for use by
the public rather than research technology for use in the laboratory. 47 For
example, mapping and sequencing a gene of interest may lead to the development of a screening test for a genetic disease or to the production of a useful
protein through recombinant DNA technology. Patent protection for such
inventions is less troubling and more compelling than it is for inventions that
are primarily of interest to researchers. Making a new invention available to
a market of ordinary consumers is a function traditionally performed by
commercial firms in our economy, even when there is a strong public interest
in widespread availability of the invention at low cost, as in the case of a new
drug. It stands to reason that commercial firms will be more willing to perform this function if their profits are protected by patent rights than if they
can recover only a competitive rate of return. Moreover, if an invention has
a significant market outside the research community, the patent owner might
focus its enforcement of the patent on the more lucrative nonresearch market
and leave the occasional laboratory user alone. Indeed, the patent owner may
welcome the use of its invention by researchers in the hope that they will
develop new uses for the patented technology and thereby open up new markets for the patent owner to exploit.
Assuming that patent protection is necessary to encourage firms to make
these discoveries available commercially, one might ask whether current law
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provides adequate protection. It is helpful to distinguish different types of
inventions emanating from the Genome Project and to consider the availability and consequences of patent protection for different categories of
invention separately.
So far, new biotechnology products have typically emerged from the following sequence of discoveries. First, a naturally occurring protein is identified as having medical significance, perhaps because its absence causes disease
symptoms in individuals who fail to produce adequate quantities ofit in their
own systems. The protein is then isolated and purified from natural sources,
allowing it to be characterized and perhaps making it available in small quantities for therapeutic purposes. Next, the gene for the protein is cloned, disclosing the DNA sequence encoding the protein and allowing its production
in larger quantities through recombinant DNA technology. The recombinant
protein is then clinically tested and eventually displaces the natural protein
in sales for therapeutic purposes.
As the Genome Project proceeds, the direction of discovery is reversed in
some cases as researchers look for genetic causes of diseases whose biochemical mechanisms are not yet understood. In this "reverse genetics," 48 the first
step is to locate the gene on a specific region of a particular chromosome
through genetic linkage studies using DNA markers. At this point it may be
possible to use the markers to develop a genetic screening test to identify carriers of the disease gene. Depending on the distance between the closest
known markers on either side of the gene, it may be necessary to undertake
biochemical studies of differences in gene product in the tissue of affected and
unaffected individuals in order to find the actual gene of interest. Eventually,
the disease gene itself is found, cloned, and sequenced, and the protein associated with the disease is identified.
The NIH patent applications on partial cDNA sequences reveal yet
another discovery path, in which the first step is to sequence portions ofrandomly selected clones from a cDNA library representing the genes expressed
in a given tissue sample. These partial sequences, called expressed sequence
tags or ESTs, may then be used to isolate the full gene, the function of which
is subsequently determined.
'
The foregoing trails of discovery yield a series of candidates for patent protection: purified, naturally occurring proteins; protein purification processes;
DNA sequences coding for proteins of interest; DNA sequence markers for
use in genetic screening tests; DNA sequences whose function has not yet
been determined; recombinant vectors and host cells; cloning processes;
recombinant proteins; processes for obtaining recombinant proteins from
host cells; and processes for administering natural or recombinant proteins
in the treatment of disease. Some of these discoveries are end products for sale
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to consumers, and some are processes for using these end products. Others
may be thought of as manufacturing processes yielding end products or starting materials for use in manufacturing processes, or research intermediaries
for use in developing products and processes of more immediate commercial
interest.
From the patent holder's standpoint, generally the most effective commercial protection is offered by a patent on the end product that is sold to consumers. Such a patent is superior to a patent on a process of using the end
product in that it is not limited to any particular use of the product, and it is
superior to a patent on the manufacturing process in that it is not limited to
any particular method of production. Somewhat less effective is a patent on
starting materials for use in making the end product. Such a patent offers no
protection against use of the patented starting materials abroad and then
importing the unpatented end product into the United States for sales in competition with the patent holder. 49 Weaker still is a patent on products or processes used only during product development, since an injunction against
infringement of such a patent would not serve to keep a competitor off the
market so long as the use is not continuing.

Problems with Process Claims. Before the Supreme Court upheld the patentability of living organisms in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, process patents
were the mainstay of patent protection for biotechnology inventions. Patents
were issued and their validity upheld on claims to processes using bacteria to
treat sewage, 50 or to produce chemicals51 or drugs, 52 although the bacteria used
in these processes were generally assumed to be unpatentable. Today it is clear
that recombinant microorganisms and host cells may be patented in their
own right, assuming they are new, useful, and nonobvious. But there are still
advantages to obtaining patent rights in processes using these biological materials to make end products, particularly if the end products themselves are not
patentable.
The most significant advantage is that a process patent offers superior protection against competing imports of the end product. The difference is due
to peculiarities in the definition of infringement arising from recent amendments to the patent statute to fortify process patent protection. Prior to 1988,
the commercial effectiveness of process patents was largely limited to use of
the claimed process in the United States. A competitor could use the patented
process abroad and import the unpatented products of the process into the
United States for sale without infringement liability, although in some cases
the patent holder had a limited remedy against importation of the products
under the Tariff Act. 53 This gap in process patent protection was largely remedied with passage of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 54
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which included a provision expanding the definition of patent infringement
to include importing into the United States or selling or using within the
United States a product made by a process patented in the United States. 55
But the statutory change failed to provide comparable protection against
imports to holders of product patents on essential starting materials such as
recombinant organisms. As a result, the holder of a patent on a recombinant
organism useful to make a valuable protein has no remedy against a competitor who uses the organism abroad and imports the end product into the
United States. 56 In order to obtain such a remedy, it is necessary to obtain a
patent on the process of using the recombinant organism to produce the protein.
In recent years, however, the Patent and Trademark Office has taken a
restrictive view of the patentability of such biotechnology processes. Relying
on a 1985 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,57 the Patent
and Trademark Office has rejected as obvious patent claims to conventional
processes using novel and nonobvious starting materials to produce novel
and nonobvious end products. 58 Legislation is currently pending in Congress
that, if passed, would provide that process patent protection shall not be
denied on grounds of obviousness for a process of making or using a patentable product. 59 In the meantime, firms that use standard processes to express
recombinant proteins in novel recombinant organisms may find that they are
unable to patent the processes and must instead try to patent the recombinant
starting materials or protein end products.
Even apart from questions of patentability, there are problems with detection and proof of infringement of process patents. Unless the patented process
is the only means of making an unpatented product, it may be difficult to tell
whether a competitor used the patented method or some other, noninfringing
method. Moreover, even if the patented process is initially the only means of
making the product, a process patent offers no protection against competitors
who develop noninfringing means of making the product in the future. Patents on processes for using, as opposed to making, unpatented products suffer
from a similar problem. A patent on a process of using an unpatented product
for a certain purpose, such as to treat a particular disease, is difficult to enforce
if the product has other, noninfringing, uses because it may be hard to monitor just what purchasers are doing with the product. Thus even where process
patent protection is available, the commercial monopoly it offers may be narrow, difficult to enforce, and short-lived.

Problems with Protein Claims. As a general rule, a patent on an end product
provides more powerful protection than a patent on either starting materials
or processes for making or using the end product. In the biotechnology ind us-
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try the end product is often a protein. Claims to the protein product itself
would avoid the difficulties cited above for monitoring and enforcing process
patent claims and would be less vulnerable to changes in technology that
allow manufacture of the product through other means.
On the other hand, the validity of patent claims to proteins may be more
vulnerable to challenge than that of process claims. One ground for challenge
is that proteins are unpatentable products of nature. The proteins that are
likely targets for commercial production through recombinant DNA technology for the most part exist and perform important functions in nature. So
far patent holders have avoided this difficulty by limiting their claims so as
not to cover the naturally occurring product. For example, the claims may
specify a degree of purity for the protein that is not duplicated in nature without human intervention. Such limitations on the scope of the claim, while
possibly avoiding a .. product of nature" rejection, may also narrow the scope
of the patent to a degree that allows significant competition beyond the reach
of the patent monopoly. For example, a competitor might avoid infringement by selling a product that is either more or less pure than that claimed in
the patent.
A competitor might also be able to avoid the scope of the patent monopoly
by varying the chemical structure of the protein if it is possible to do so without destroying its function. Sometimes minor changes in amino acid
sequence do not interfere with the biological activity of a protein. Some patent applicants have attempted through careful claim drafting to include
minor variations in amino acid sequence within the scope of the patent, but
a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit calls into
question the effectiveness of this practice.60
Another limitation to patents on proteins is suggested in a recent Federal
Circuit opinion in a lawsuit brought by the holder of a patent on purified Factor VIII:C against a firm that was making recombinant Factor VIII:C. 61 The
court noted that although the patent claims on purified Factor VIIl:C
obtained from blood plasma literally covered the recombinant product, the
recombinant manufacturer might nonetheless be able to avoid infringement
liability under the rarely invoked .. reverse doctrine of equivalents"62 if it
could show sufficient differences in specific activities and purity between the
recombinant product and the plasma-derived product.63
A further problem with protein claims is that the protein may have been
known and characterized in the literature before the gene encoding it was
cloned. In this situation the protein may have become unpatentable on
grounds of prior knowledge, use, or publication,64 or it may even be claimed
in a prior patent65 that presents an obstacle to subsequent innovators who
wish to produce the protein through recombinant DNA technology.
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Even previously unknown proteins may become unpatentable on grounds
of obviousness as the Genome Project progresses. Indeed, once the complete
DNA sequence of the human genome is known, it might be argued that all
proteins encoded in that known sequence have become obvious.

Problems with DNA Sequence Claims. The foregoing discussion reveals a
number of circumstances in which a patent applicant's best hope may be a
product claim on a DNA sequence or recombinants incorporating that
sequence, although such a claim offers less effective commercial protection
than either a product claim on the protein end product or a process claim on
the method of producing the protein. The protein itself may be unpatentable
because it was previously known or even patented, and the process may be
unpatentable because it is obvious. A DNA sequence may also be the most
likely target for a patent claim where the invention consists of identifying a
gene that is associated with an inherited disease or a DNA marker in close
proximity to that gene rather than cloning a gene for the purpose of expressing
a protein. In this situation the DNA sequence itself may be thought of as an
end product, useful in a genetic screening test, rather than as a starting material in making a protein.
Like proteins, DNA sequences are arguably unpatentable products of
nature. So far the Patent and Trademark Office and the courts have allowed
patent applicants and patent holders to get past this hurdle by limiting their
claims to an "isolated and purified" DNA sequence, 66 or to a human-engineered recombinant vector or host cell incorporating the sequence. 67
Claims to chromosomal DNA markers not coding for any identified gene
product might face a further hurdle in the requirement that a patented invention be useful. The fact that markers are useful to scientists seeking to map
and sequence the human genome may not be sufficient evidence of utility to
make them patentable. 68 On the other hand, a marker that is sufficiently close
to a disease gene to be useful in screening for carriers should certainly satisfy
the utility test. In its patent applications on partial cDNAs, for example, NIH
asserts that the sequences are useful for forensic identification and tissue typing.
As cloning procedures become more routine, it is likely that DNA
sequences coding for known proteins will be deemed obvious, especially
when the amino acid sequence for the target protein is known. It is also possible that knowledge of partial cDNA sequences will make obvious the corresponding full genes. So far, in assessing the obviousness of patent claims to
DNA sequences the courts have focused on the obviousness of the process of
cloning and identifying the gene of interest, upholding claims to sequences
that were difficult to isolate.69 As the Genome Project progresses, greater expe-
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rience will inevitably make more DNA sequences obvious under this
approach.
Even when they are patentable, claims to DNA sequences may have limited commercial value. Where DNA sequences are, in effect, starting materials for making desired proteins, patents on the DNA sequences offer less
effective commercial protection, particularly against foreign competition,
than either patents on the proteins themselves or process patents on the
method of making the proteins. 10 Patent claims to partial gene sequences used
only as research intermediaries to find the full genes offer even less effective
protection.
Another potential problem with claims to DNA sequences as starting
materials has to do with the scope of the claims in light of the degeneracy of
the genetic code. Numerous substitutions may be made in a nucleotide
sequence without changing the amino acid sequence of the gene product. Do
these substitutions remove the altered sequence from the scope of the patent
claim? The answer certainly should be no, but the matter is not entirely free
from doubt.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit touched on this issue in its
recent decision in the case of Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. 71 One
of the patents at issue in that case included a broadly worded claim to any
purified and isolated DNA sequence "encoding a polypeptide having an
amino acid sequence sufficiently duplicative of that of erythropoietin to allow
possession of [biological properties of erythropoietin]." 72 The court held this
claim invalid for lack ofan adequate disclosure of how to make more than a
few of the many "analog genes" that would fall within the scope of the claim. 73
The court was careful to note, however, that it did not "intend to imply that
generic claims to genetic sequences cannot be valid where they are of a scope
appropriate to the invention disclosed by an applicant. " 74
Although the opinion is not free from ambiguity on this point, a reasonable
reading would allow patent holders to claim DNA sequences in sufficiently
broad terms to include, at the very least, analogous sequences that do not alter
the gene product. It is well understood among geneticists that the genetic code
is redundant in that certain amino acids may be encoded by any of a number
of "codons" of three nucleotides. These interchangeable codons have long
been identified, and the substitution of one for another in a DNA sequence
would be obvious to anyone skilled in the field. To permit competitors to
avoid the patent through such inconsequential substitutions would be manifestly unfair and contrary to established principles of patent law. 75 By contrast, changes in DNA sequence that alter the gene product in ways that do
not change its biological activity are far more difficult to predict. Thus a sensible reading of the Amgen decision would prevent generic claiming of DNA
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sequences when the variations claimed yield different gene products, but not
when the variations in the sequence amount to substitutions of recognized
equivalents that yield the same gene product.

Conclusion
The enormous potential commercial implications of knowledge gained
through the Genome Project make it inevitable that some of that knowledge
will be patented. Federal law encourages this result by promoting the patenting of inventions made in the course of federally sponsored research. This
federal policy rests on the assumption that patenting helps to ensure widespread availability of the results of sponsored research through commercial
dissemination. The wisdom of this policy rests in large part on the empirical
validity of this assumption. If the assumption is valid, then there may be cause
for concern that patent law provides inadequate protection for some biotechnology inventions at this time. Of particular concern are limitations on the
patentability of biotechnology processes and possible limits on the scope of
protection available for proteins and DNA sequences. On the other hand, the
current federal policy may cause scientists to retard dissemination of new
findings within the scientific community and to restrict access to new inventions among scientists, all to the detriment of progress in the Genome Project.
If it turns out that patent protection is not necessary in order to ensure widespread public dissemination of these inventions, this may be a big price to pay
for little or nothing in the way of social benefits.
Given the importance of funding from private industry to biomedical
research today, one should not assume that patent protection for the results
of the Genome Project is unnecessary. The small amounts offederal funding
projected for the Project cannot be expected to displace private funding in this
area. Moreover, even if public funding were sufficient to cover mapping and
sequencing efforts, lack of patent rights might undermine incentives for the
private sector to support subsequent research to put this information to practical use. In the meantime, obstacles to progress in the Genome Project as a
result of patent rights might be addressed through more limited reforms without calling into question the wisdom of promoting patent protection. Problems of interim secrecy could be ameliorated by decreasing delays in the prosecution of biotechnology patent applications in the Patent and Trademark
Office. Concerns about restrictions on the use of patented inventions in subsequent research might be met through the exercise of march-in rights by
funding agencies or through enactment of an experimental use exemption to
infringement liability in this context. These sorts of reforms might help min-

Patent Rights in the Human Genome Project

24 I

imize friction between the patent system and traditional scientific norms
without jeopardizing incentives for private support ofresearch in this area.
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